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Editorial 19

Written by December 07 2020 0

“Colombia El Pais de los Extremos” (Colombia the Nation of Extremes) is Ecuadorian diplomat-scholar Eduardo Durán-Cousín’s new, 783-pages-long history and analysis of more than 500 years of Colombia’s cultural, social, economic and political triumphs and tragedies.

For any foreigner sufficiently fluent in Spanish and trying to understand why Colombia in several key ways is more like -- but simultaneously also more un-like -- the United States than any other Latin American country, “Colombia El Pais de los Extremos” (La Carreta Editores, published in Medellin, September 2020) can be useful, as it’s the most recent scholarly work here -- widely reviewed in the Colombia mainstream media (and now, here, in Medellin Herald).

The book’s early chapters recount the European-biased observations of Spanish explorers, priests and conquerors about the existing and highly diverse aboriginal peoples here -- some of them relatively peaceful, pastoral, even submissive tribes, others (especially in Antioquia) more interested in trade and commerce, while still other tribes – and later-on, through their inter-mingled Spanish/native descendants -- practicing unimaginable savagery, conquests and even cannibalism.

The book’s most controversial (and racist) speculations about Colombia’s pre-and-post-Spanish-conquest-peoples include sections positing the notion that DNA and customs of the most savage tribes here later infected and subconsciously provoked incredibly bloody savagery by many current and past guerrillas, political armies and gangster groups here. One can only wonder what was in the pipe, smoking, when these paragraphs were written, given the horrific history of the entire human race (Nazis and Auschwitz, for example?)

But leaving aside dubious speculations about the origins of Colombian savagery, more important and more revealing is Durán-Cousín’s recounting of the central importance of the people of Medellin and Antioquia for dominating national (and even international) industry and commerce, even with the physical shifting or duplication of some local, foundational factories and some national administrative offices from Medellin to demographically bigger Bogota in recent decades.

As Durán-Cousín writes in the book’s first words about Antioquia, “the proverbial entrepreneurial spirt of Colombians, facilitated by the chronic absence of a strong central government, began in Antioquia and from there, by example and by migration of Antioquian people, irradiated throughout the country” -- a phenomenon especially apparent in the second half of the 20th Century.

Even more remarkably, in the latter part of the 19th Century, Medellin not only became the most important industrial city in Colombia, but also the most important manufacturing center in all of northern South America, Durán-Cousín points out, citing numerous sources.

Citing (for example) noted Colombian economic historian Salomon Kalmanovitz, Durán-Cousín recounts several crucial factors explaining why the “paisas” (the people of Antioquia) have dominated Colombian commerce and industry.

First came profitable gold mining here, then banking, then coffee exporting, then the rise of supporting industries (textiles, foundries, manufactures) --all crucially undergirded by the entrepreneurial, industrious customs of a particular sub-group of mainly Spanish descendants, many of them with Jewish cultural roots (although most forcibly converted to Catholicism during and after the mass expulsions and persecutions by the Spanish Inquisition starting 500 years ago and continuing for centuries afterward).

Notable also is that such historic discrimination and persecution continued in Colombia even right up until the early 19th Century in the Caribbean coastal city of Cartagena -- distant from the relatively safe, remote mountains of Antioquia, where if one so desired, one’s past could be more easily hidden, ignored, downplayed, low-keyed or forgotten, which helped to open doors to new freedom and opportunity (as some of Colombia’s greatest novelists likewise have illustrated).

What’s more, a peculiar flavor of Catholicism --mainly practiced here in Antioquia-- is much more inclined to accept financial success as not inconsistent with spiritual salvation, Durán-Cousín notes.

As such, one can see parallels to the North American historical experience -- where countless industrious people escaping European persecutions and prejudices likewise found freedom, opportunity and prosperity in the New World.

However, Antioquia -- with few exceptions -- mostly avoided the poisonous, debilitating, dehumanizing and lethargy-inspiring crime of African slavery that has scarred, wrecked and ruined so much of an otherwise “freedom-loving” USA – even right up to today. A shameful history linked to a hypocritical kind of “Christian” prosperity where even slavery got trumped-up Biblical excuses and exemptions.

In contrast, the growth of a huge middle class of Antioquian entrepreneurs here – NOT employing slavery – came via the coffee boom of the 19th and 20th centuries, starting in Antioquia and expanding to neighboring departments.

This self-sufficient, entrepreneurial idiosyncrasy is at the core of what makes a “paisa,” Durán-Cousín notes – and this resonates among vast portions of the North American population as well.

But while one can find correlations between many paisas and many North Americans, contradictions also exist, although some of these have been overcome through time, the book shows.

For example: U.S.-Colombian relations were strained with the secession more than 100 years ago of the former Panama province from the nation of Colombia. But the book notes that Panamanians overwhelmingly favored that separation, for both economic and political reasons, starting with the historical negligence of Colombia’s central government toward outlying provinces.

But ever since the Colombia Congress in 1923 ratified the Urrutia-Thompson Treaty that required the U.S. government to compensate Colombia for the Panamanian secession, Colombia has maintained particularly strong political, economic and military-aid ties with the U.S., much to the consternation of pro-Soviet, pro-communist and other left-wing politicians.

However, despite these cold-war and post-cold-war era political conflicts, as well as the “La Violencia” civil war of 1948 to 1958 and the subsequent FARC, ELN and M-19 guerrilla terrorism, Colombia’s other, prior, centuries-long political struggles – triggering frequent, bloody civil wars --weren’t fought along class lines (peasant versus landlord, worker versus capitalist), Durán-Cousín notes.

Rather, these wars were mainly between the “elites-dominated” Conservative and Liberal Parties -- conflicts that came to an end following the brief military government of General Rojas Pinilla at the end of the “La Violencia” conflict of the 1950s, the book notes.

Then, in 1991, Colombia enacted a new, modernized, liberal Constitution, which triggered the decline of the old Liberal and Conservative Parties and gave rise to a multiplicity of new parties of various ideological stripes and of “charismatic” leaders.

In some respects, today’s non-violent political battles in Colombia are similar to the non-violent political battles between Democrat and Republican Parties in the U.S., at least following the end of the U.S. Civil War of 1860-1865.

Unfortunately, like so many other Latin American historic and sociological treatises, Durán-Cousín’s “Colombia El Pais de los Extremos” book falls into a familiar trap of lamenting the absence here of a strong, unified, class-based social-democratic “left” party that would compete for votes with a more traditional, capitalist-oriented conservative party.

Supposedly, a strong social-democrat party here arguably would have provided an alternative to the violent communist guerrilla movements, which (falsely) were claimed to have arisen because of “oppression” and “lack of democracy” in Colombia. In fact, Colombia’s democracy is more than 200 years old, and left-wing currents (and several coalition governments) have long been a part of the Liberal Party, although centrist and rightist factions frequently dominated among the Liberals. Social-democrat factions also have existed in the Conservative Party and in its various coalition governments, the book shows.

On the other hand, Durán-Cousín correctly observes that Colombia’s relatively violent political history has mainly been a competition between some well-off elites, supported by the majority of poorer populations, with the poor used as cannon-fodder in the many civil wars.

Yet history shows that the same cynicism is just as true of the FARC and other communist, extreme leftist, narco-communist and paramilitary gangsters here, all of whom have sought to overthrow or manipulate the existing capitalist elites and replace them or sabotage them with crypto-capitalists -- communist and narco-gangster dictatorial power -- rather than bring about any real “social justice.”

In his proposed recipes for reform, Durán-Cousín also unfortunately repeats the old canard that what Colombia really needs is “land reform” that supposedly would end the injustice of relatively few big landholders “misusing” their landholdings and preventing poor peasants from getting a bigger piece of the land pie.

First problem with this argument: agricultural producers need profitable products from land, not just bigger areas of land.

Second problem: Splitting up big haciendas into smaller parcels -- supposedly to benefit hundreds of thousands or millions of mainly rural residents – wouldn’t automatically yield profits from that land -- and may do the opposite, by imposing smallholder inefficiencies.

Which is why coca and cocaine have conquered vast acreages among Colombia’s small farmers (not the big haciendas), as “white powder” is far more profitable than “land reform.” And which explains why thousands of FARC militants since have abandoned the 2015 “peace treaty” and gone back to cocaine trafficking, murder and extorsion -- as these are more profitable than conventional subsistence farming or the fantastical idea of “land reform.”

Correctly, Durán-Cousín laments the historic fragmentation of Colombia -- caused by weak central government, a mountainous, isolated terrain and very poor roads compared to its neighbors -- which helps explain the historic rise of warlord guerrilla armies and violent political competitions.

But he gets the solution wrong, by proposing the elevation of a stronger, unified left-wing party to counter the power of the existing conservative “elites” and thus supposedly expanding social justice, peacefully.

Ironically, the one Colombian President who did more than all others in the entire history of the country to boost social progress, economic progress, reduce isolation and diminish narco-terrorist violence wasn’t a “left” or “right” President.

Just the opposite.

Instead, this uniting President was Alvaro Uribe Velez, a thoroughly centrist politician -- a rather steelier version of incoming centrist U.S. President Joe Biden -- who won the hearts and minds of a huge majority of all Colombian social classes and regions, twice.

The only Colombian President in history who spent his weekends during his two terms traveling to every small town and village in every corner of the country, listening to ordinary people (not elites), promoting and elevating Colombia as one nation, one people, one democracy, seeking greater economic, political and social progress. And suffering numerous assassination attempts in the process.

The only President who virtually destroyed the FARC militarily and potentially paved the way for a future “peace” agreement that some day might actually achieve real, laudable goals, rather than the current “peace” mess that hasn’t stopped guerrilla violence, corruption or massive narco-trafficking.

Likewise, the only President who without fear welcomes face-to-face debate with Colombia’s leftist extremists -- including angry students and demagogic politicians.

The one politician who put country above class or ideology, at the risk of his own life. But also the one that Durán-Cousín terms in the book as a “clientelist” politician, like something in the mode of a “caudillo.”

Erroneous again.

Uribe -- unlike typical banana-republic strongmen, or hate-spewing, demagogic, reactionary hucksters like outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump – is a through-and-through democrat, unafraid of losing any election and unflinching in the face of continuing persecutions by corrupt judges, ideological extremists and jealous political rivals of various stripes.

Which is exactly what Colombia has always needed -- not “land reform,” or demagogues, or a “stronger left-wing party” as Durán-Cousín suggests. Instead, what Colombia needs is more centrists, more moderates, more unifiers, more reformers, more investors, more middle-class people, more kind, decent and ethical people, more educated people, more entrepreneurial people and more democrats (with a small “d”).

Written by December 01 2020 0

Editor's Note: The annual Colombia Gold Symposium (CGS) conference here in Medellin -- organized by CGS director, veteran mining journalist and British expat Paul Harris -- brings together leading international and domestic mining companies, consultants and government regulators, to explore the challenges and opportunities of gold mining here in Antioquia as well as elsewhere in Colombia and in neighboring countries.

Below we reprint Paul Harris' outstanding recap of the history of the giant Buritica, Antioquia gold-mining project, recently sold by Canadian mining developer Continental Resources to Chinese mining giant Zijin Resources.  This article is not only factual but also keenly observational about the profound risks and rewards of undertaking large-scale gold and copper mining in Antioquia and Colombia.  Harris's opinions are of course his own and not necessarily those of Medellin Herald. Enjoy!


Buritica: A Triumph Against the Odds
from: Colombia Gold Symposium (CGS) December2020 newsletter
by Paul Harris
(for subscription information, see: https://colombiagold.co/ )

On Friday 23 October 2020, Colombian President Ivan Duque helped inaugurate Zijin Continental Gold’s 282,000 ounces/year Buritica gold mine in Antioquia, Colombia.

A day of positivity and hope was more subdued than it perhaps should have been given Covid-19 social distancing measures, but was perhaps fitting given the abnormal trials and tribulations the project overcame to become Colombia’s biggest producing underground gold mine.

Buritica today is an example of modernity and the power of investment with two, 5x5-meters tunnels driven into the orebody which is being exploited by a mechanized mining fleet, a far cry from the narrow tunnel into which one walked, doubled over into the Centena mine scratched out of the rock using decades-old methods where the Buritica story began.

Finding an economic deposit and building a mine is a challenging task at the best of times, but Buritica took a superhuman effort to overcome the extraordinary challenges of operating in Colombia.

Ten years ago, reaching the Centena mine meant a thirty-minute mule ride down the precipitous slopes, a journey which almost claimed one worker in the early days whose mule slipped and fell sending him crashing down the slope only to be stopped by barbed wire which left him with thankful for his life and with a gruesome scar on his neck.

The town of Buritica is named after a local cacique who was burned for not revealing to Spanish Conquistadores the source of the gold in the region, a stubbornness and stoicism which has echoed through the ages and characterized the efforts of the project’s promoters to advance it, facing similar aggression from multiple sources along the way.

Continental Gold was the vision of Bob Allen, owner of Grupo de Bullet, who had operated the Centena mine for many years and believed it could be something more.

Having formed Continental Gold in May 2007, he convinced some of the most astute investors in the junior mining space to invest including George Ireland’s Geologic Resource fund and Passport Capital’s Neil Adshead—who subsequently became a key part of the Sprott Natural Resources team—as part of the initial investor group.

Allen named the company Continental Gold because he liked expansive connotation of the name, suggestive of a multinational organization with multiple assets in the hemisphere. The first logo of Continental Gold replicated the globe logo of Continental Airlines, with Allen adamant the company should not adopt a Colombia artifact as a logo as other companies had done, although it subsequently did with the change of management in 2010, adopting the Tolima jaguar man as its central figure.

Allen’s stubbornness and drive were key in the early days when, less than a year old, he funded the company going from his own pocket for more than a year following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis which saw the gold price plunge and the capital markets close.

During this time, he resisted many predatory offers to acquire the company too cheaply, convinced of its underlying value, until the company did a reverse takeover deal with Cronus Resources in early 2010 which brought Ari Sussman into the company as CEO.

“I sent Vic Wall and Greg Hall, and former Placer Dome chief geologist to visit Buritica. After a day in the underground mine they called me and said they think it is Porgera [a large gold and silver mine in Papua New Guinea]. That was the defining moment and they ended up being right,” said Sussman.

Continental debuted on the TSX in April 2020 and the timing could not have been better: the rapid recovery from the GFC propelled the gold price towards what would eventually be record highs in 2011; Colombia was the hottest gold exploration jurisdiction in the world due to the economic opening that accompanied the Democratic Security policy of president Alvaro Uribe and dozens of exploration juniors flooded into the country as Canadian capital markets wanted couldn’t get enough.

These conditions, together with high-grade drill results, enabled Sussman to take Continental from a small mine barely generating enough cash to pay its staff to a billion-dollar market capitalization in little over a year as its share price topped out at C$10.78 barely eight months after listing, before it put out a resource estimate or an economic study.

Sussman hired the best people he could to help him advance the project such as the late geologist Vic Wall as special advisor, who was instrumental in changing the geological interpretation of Buritica from being a mesothermal vein system to a carbonate base metal vein system, which unlocked the door to defining a large resource.

Buritica’s resource grew rapidly from an initial 3.1 million ounces gold equivalent in 2011 to just shy of 9 million ounces in June 2015, and now standing at more than 11 million ounces.

He also hired COO Don Gray fresh from the successful construction of the Escobal silver mine in Guatemala to build the mine, former Cerrejon, CEO Leon Teicher as chair in March 2015, Mateo Restrepo as EVP (and later president) in August 2015 and in 2018, he brought former EVP and COO of Cerrejón Luis Meneses out of retirement as country manager, who brought a very senior manager’s hat to the table which stabilized the company and allowed the construction to proceed without further problems.

Restrepo brought a deep understanding of both the political and private sector spheres having formerly been an advisor to former president Alvaro Uribe and an executive at the Prodeco coal mine.

Teicher was former president and CEO of the Cerrejon coal mine in La Guajira, Colombia, had long experience dealing with government and local community issues, and brought a big mining mindset to the board, the company’s corporate governance and the way it operated. These latter two were to prove instrumental to overcome the many challenges in store for the project.

For Sussman, success was due to the people he hired. “The tenacity of the people involved was the standout considering how complex it is to be first out of the gate for a large gold project in Colombia, pushing forward against the odds and carrying the mining sector on the shoulders of the company. This took really talented people,” he said.

However, Sussman’s don was fund raising. He raised C$28.75 million with the initial public offering and subsequent raises of C$68.4 million in September 2010 on the back of its first reported drill results from Veta Sur of 14.3m grading 446 grams per tonne of gold and 166g/t silver.

A C$86.3 million raising in November 2012 meant the company didn’t have to raise money again for four years, which enabled Continental to weather the bear market without the dilutive financings which destroyed other juniors.

“The 2012 saw us raise at highest share price ever. We were offered a lot more money and I knew the market was at a top and I should have taken more money to reduce dilution later,” he said.

Sussman also raised US$250 million project financing in January 2017, a $109 million investment from Newmont Mining in May 2017 and $175 million in additional project financing in March 2019. In total, he raised at least $800 million for the project over the past ten years.

Ultimately, while setting Continental and Buritica on a path for success, with the prospect of having to return refinance at a time when the Canadian capital markets were viewing Colombia as a jurisdiction with increasing risk Sussman negotiated the sale of the company to China’s Zijin Mining in March 2020 for US$989 million, a surprise to many who had naturally assumed Newmont would eventually upgrade its 19.9% stake in the Continental and buy the company.

Newmont had its hands full digesting its acquisition of Goldcorp on early 2019 and readily sold its Continental stock to Zijin, banking a nice profit. When Zijin inaugurated the mine in October, it said the development cost was $610 million, some 53% more than the February 2016 feasibility estimate of $389 million.

Challenges

Navigating geological and financial market challenges are par for the course for any junior explorer CEO, but these paled compared to the challenges Colombia had in store for the project.

The project repeatedly suffered at the hands of illegality. The high-grade gold is Buritica’s main appeal but also a security risk.

In the early days, gold doré bars were taken by road to Medellin, until bandits held up the truck it was transported in on the road to Santa Fe de Antioquia. From then on shipments were undertaken by helicopter.

High-grade gold trips the greed gene in many individuals and in rural areas of Colombia where the rule of law is often only a paper concept, nefarious things happen.

In 2010, there were no illegal miners or other small-scale miners on the Buritica concessions. They didn’t start appearing until 2012 once the company had published very high-grade drill results.

These became a flood of some 5,000 illegal miners invading the concessions in 2014-2015 with criminal organizations reportedly behind the initiative.

Meanwhile, both the local and national governments did nothing, an attitude that only changed once the illegal miners started killing themselves via unsafe workings practices and the public health calamity in the town of Buritica grew to the extent that they couldn’t ignore it anymore.

The public water system in Buritica collapsed due to the illegal processing plants installed in houses; prices for food and property rocketed which meant many locals could no longer afford basic necessities; there was a spike in the number of sexually transmitted diseases and teen pregnancies in the town as prostitution took off; an increased number of accidents on the narrow road leading to the Pan-American Highway and widespread environmental destruction including mercury contamination, which some local politicians tried to pin on Continental although it had never used mercury.

When the intervention of public forces happened in April 2016, it had nothing to do with the violation of Continental’s economic rights and probably would not have happened at all given the insouciant attitude of Antioquia’s governor at the time, were it not for the astute hire of Mateo Restrepo, who managed to corral and coordinate the various state and national authorities to action, which was partially successful in shutting down and evicting the majority of the illegal miners.

However, the job was left incomplete, which meant some of the illegal invaders remained and the company was forced to formalize them under a curious change of narrative where the criminals were recast as small miners or traditional miners—despite being recent arrivals—via a government process through which the criminal becomes legal, where theft is no longer theft if you complete some forms. Problem solved, for the government at least.

The year before, Continental let go its vice president and legal representative, essentially for acting against the company’s interests. It was believed that he was a key figure in the invasion of the illegal miners, many of whom came from Segovia where he previously worked to liquidate the Frontino Gold Mines company.

After his dismissal from Continental he was arrested in March 2016 in Buritica on suspicion of being one of the organizers of criminal mining in Antioquia, according to former president Juan Manuel Santos.

After his dismissal and prior to his arrest this individual attempted to discredit the company by accusing it of corruption and trying to buy its environmental license by bribing Corantioquia officials.

While no evidence was presented to substantiate this claim, local press ran the story anyway, which cast the company into a political hurricane, particularly given that the Antioquia governor of the moment was Sergio Fajardo, who had taken a stance against private mining companies and who essentially went out of his way to avoid assisting them in any way, such as refusing to sign concession contracts and failing to respond to the Buritica social crisis.

Fajardo’s slogan was “Antioquia, the most educated” which for mining seemed to be implicit acceptance of illegal miners stealing state resources while wreaking environmental destructing and social havoc out of sight in a backwater of the department.

The illegal miners were Antioqueños and voters after all. It is hard to understand failure to support a project which uses the best available mining and environmental technology, advanced water management systems, which now provides 1,243 direct jobs, 1,075 indirect jobs and has contributed tens of millions of dollars to social programs undertaken through strategic alliances with Conservation International and SENA among other organizations, and which will provide a strong source of funding for this department for decades.

Together with SENA, Continental developed an underground mining school which has graduated Colombia’s first female underground miners. Continental started publishing annual sustainability reports in 2017 and has undertaken various environmental protection and restoration projects, invested in local agricultural production capacity through the Future Harvest program, as well as greatly improving the health and education service provision in the town.

The political brouhaha surrounding the false corruption claims delayed Buritica’s environmental permitting by at least a year. With a lack of clarity on the progress of the Corantioquia process and an increase in the size potential of the project which was crossing the permitting threshold, the company changed to permit Buritica with the ANLA national licensing authority as the project became a PINES project of national interest. The project finally received its environmental permit in November 2016.

Just when Continental thought the majority of its challenges were behind hit, its darkest hour was yet to come.

September 2018 witnessed the murder of three local geologists by dissidents of the former FARC terrorist group at the Berlin project in Antioquia, a few short weeks after a mine engineer had been shot dead at Buritica.

The company’s share price fell to a two-year low following the murders and concerns about the broader security situation.

Buritica is a once-in-a-generation gold asset which will underpin the development of the local region for many years. It is also a testament to human will overcoming adversity; of the literal blood, sweat and tears of too many people and large-scale investment, undertaken by foreign companies, which generates benefits that largely remain in Colombia.

It will be a landmark mine in terms of production, mining practices, social development aspects and a healthy financial contributor through taxes and royalties at the national, regional and local level as it produces an annual 253,000 ounces of gold and 466,000-oz of silver.

It took stubbornness and determination to get Buritica into production, overcoming theft, corruption, invasion, criminal gangs and murder in addition to locking horns with often apathetic local and national government which abandoned the company alone to deal with rule of law issues alone.

As the money starts to roll into government coffers from Buritica, including a projected COP$3 trillion (US$786 million) in royalties, one wonders how much better many rural communities in Colombia could be doing if there had have been adequate government support for the dozens of other explorers that came to Colombia a decade ago?

Continental, for example, in 2019 made social and environmental investments totaling COP$14.6 billion and COP$13 billion in purchases from local suppliers.

In 2018, these investments were COP$8.4 billion and COP$11.5 billion respectively, and in 2017 these totaled COP$4.3 billion and COP$4.7 billion.

But looking to the future, the greatest value of Buritica could be setting out a pathway for other projects to follow of how to do advance a gold project into production in Colombia.

Written by October 10 2020 0

A Bogota District Court – having been assigned a case involving witness-tampering allegations earlier brought before an investigative unit of Colombia’s Supreme Court (“Sala de Instruccion”) – this morning (October 10) ordered the release from house arrest of former Colombia President (and former Senator) Alvaro Uribe.

District Court Judge Clara Ximena Salcedo found that under Colombia’s Constitution, it’s illegal to detain anyone that hasn’t been charged with a crime.
It’s now up to Colombia’s Attorney General to decide whether and with what evidence former President Uribe should be charged and tried on allegations originating from left-wing Senator Ivan Cepeda claiming that Uribe and one of his lawyers were involved in a witness-tampering scheme.

Understanding the Background

Senator Cepeda – who has dedicated his entire career to a vendetta against President Uribe -- continues to claim that his late father Manuel Cepeda was actually a victim of a plot by the Colombian government -- and by inference, supposedly Uribe can be seen tangentially for blame.

Manuel Cepeda -- a member of the Central Committee of the Colombian Communist Party -- was murdered in 1994 by former “AUC” paramilitary leader Carlos Castaño in an act of revenge for an earlier murder of an AUC member by the narco-communist FARC army. The FARC at the time was in political alliance with the Colombian Communist Party -- and the current FARC members in Congress (all former FARC guerrilla leaders) are very friendly with Cepeda's son, Ivan.

In Ivan Cepeda’s way of thinking, former President Alvaro Uribe can be seen as the ultimate source of the rise of Colombian paramilitaries -- including those involved in his father’s murder -- even though Uribe didn’t become Colombian President until eight years after his father's murder, and Ivan Cepeda has never accused Uribe of actual involvement in the murder.

Ironically, it  was former President Cesar Gaviria – not former President Uribe – who legally founded the “Convivir” rural paramilitary movement (later succeeded by the AUC). “Convivir” at first was dedicated exclusively to fighting the FARC terrorists but eventually – mainly due to a lack of government funding -- degenerated into yet another narco-terrorist group, fighting against its rival FARC.

In Colombia’s never-ending political cannibalism, Uribe had earlier publicly charged that Senator Cepeda illegally tried to get jailed paramilitary criminals – including several jailed and/or extradited to the U.S. by Uribe – to take revenge against Uribe with trumped-up charges of involvement in alleged paramilitary murders of supposedly innocent civilians decades ago.

When a Colombian court dismissed Uribe’s allegations of Cepeda’s witness tampering, the court instead took-up Cepeda’s counter-charges, claiming Uribe and one of his lawyers illegally tampered with those same criminal witnesses.

To better understand the reasons behind Senator Cepeda’s vendetta against Uribe – a vendetta not coincidentally shared by Uribe rival, former President Manuel Santos and several of President Santos’ financially corrupted appointees to Colombia’s Supreme Court – it’s useful to examine a January 13, 2015 investigative report by astute Colombian political blog, Trinchera Politica.

We reproduce below (in full) an English translation of the Trinchera Politica report here:

Iván Cepeda: Revenge of the Heir to the 42nd Front of the FARC
Author: Trinchera Politica (blog)
13 January 2015

Manuel Cepeda Vargas [Senator Ivan Cepeda’s father] was a leftist ideologue, perhaps the one who best applied the concept of the [late Soviet Union Communist dictator Vladimir Lenin’s] ‘combination of all forms of struggle’ to achieve power.

Not in vain, [Manuel Cepeda’s] comrade Álvaro Delgado describes in his book, All Past Times Were Worse: “Like an unscrupulous man who fell in love with the [FARC] monster that he created together with the Communist Party, Manuel Cepeda Vargas helped the FARC to cleanse the Communist Party of all those [idealistic militants] who got tired of the massacres and violence that the FARC carried out.”

For his part, Steven Dudley, in his book Armas y Urnas [Weapons and Ballot-Boxes] with a single sentence shows how monstrous Cepeda Vargas became: “Manuel Cepeda was an 'orthodox' communist who first marginalized the democratic socialists (...) who defended the ‘combination of all forms of struggle.’ Using both legal and illegal means to take power was Manuel’s creed and, as a member of the Communist Party, he had among his responsibilities to maintain contact with the FARC (…) [but] his indiscretions cost him his life.”

Thanks to their tenacity in defending the armed struggle regardless of the methods, the FARC christened their most bloodthirsty Front with the name, ‘Manuel Cepeda Vargas.’

It is not in vain that the FARC Front that bears his name did not mind destroying an entire town in order to assassinate a few soldiers. You just have to see how Manuel Cepeda’s friend Álvaro Delgado, a fellow member of the Communist Party, describes [Manuel Cepeda], and how he is shown in the book, Weapons and Ballot-Boxes, in which they unmask a man who [possibly unwittingly] helped annihilate his own political party [including the Union Patriotica (UP) coalition] to justify the armed struggle. For a sinister character like this, the popular adage that says ‘the end justifies the means’ fits very well.

The FARC learned very well from their teacher and as the book Armas y Urnas shows, the FARC, by order of Jacobo Arenas, undertook [murders] against the [Communist-Party-led coalition] Union Patriotico (UP) in order to justify their armed struggle by murdering hundreds of them. It is for this reason that it is unconvincing that both the Union Patriotico and Manuel Cepeda supposedly died at the hands of [Colombian government] state organizations, because in principle it was the same FARC who persecuted those who demobilized, as they do today by assassinating deserters through their courts-martial.

Manuel Cepeda was assassinated in Bogotá on August 9, 1994, and the Colombian state, in the absence of a legal defense policy, was condemned by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for his murder and [the government] was ordered to write a [sanitized] biography about his life, showing him as an integral man, to cleanse the memory of a being that really, if his life was as his comrades in the struggle paint it, did a lot of damage to our country and rivers of blood that have flowed in his name.

However, this chapter would not end here, as [former AUC leader] Carlos Castaño Gil himself admitted in his book, My Confession, on page 213. Castaño confesses to having directed and ordered the AUC Command to end the life of the then-Senator Manuel Cepeda, in retaliation for a murder [against an AUC member] ordered by the FARC. For Castaño Gil, the death of Manuel Cepeda [supposedly] would be a blow that would hurt the FARC.

But the Colombian Supreme Court declared the evidence [of Carlos Castaño’s confession] was illegal, as it was not provided in due time for the [trial] process, thus leaving the belief that state agents were the ones who murdered [Manuel Cepeda]. But Carlos Castaño's testimony is corroborated by his brother-in-law Jesús Emiro Pereira, a confidant of the head of the AUC, who assured that he himself accompanied the command that would take Cepeda’s life.

Iván Cepeda Castro’s Emergence

In turn, Manuel Cepeda’s son -- now Senator Iván Cepeda Castro, who has always been a member of left-wing parties and who even lived in Communist Cuba during his childhood, was later elected Senator for the Polo Democratico party.

Senator Ivan Cepeda has waged his most stubborn struggle to try to prove that his father was not killed by Carlos Castaño, but rather by the Colombian state and thus clear the name of his late father. Even though Carlos Castaño confessed to having ended the life of the late UP Senator [that is, Manuel Cepeda], Senator Ivan Cepeda Castro has tried by all possible means to have the death of his father be recognized as a crime of the state.

Now Senator Iván Cepeda Castro -- as founder of the “Manuel Cepeda Vargas Foundation” and from his jurisdiction as defender of the human rights of state victims -- has proposed to tell the story of the [Colombian guerrilla] conflict through organizations such as Memoria Historica, which is presided over by the confessed former ELN guerrilla member Leon Valencia.

If Iván Cepeda has tried to distort the story of his father’s death, then how can we expect the story of the conflict to be told? Perhaps in the same way in which he tries to hide that the death of his father was executed by Carlos Castaño.

Iván Cepeda is also a recognized detractor of the Colombian military forces. We must remember episodes and verbal confrontations such as the one he had with retired General Jaime Ruiz who made mention of the son of a late guerrilla leader who always opposed military-court jurisdiction [over alleged crimes by members of the military].

It is reality that Senator Ivan Cepeda at the beginning of 2013 demanded the end of military jurisdiction [courts] and finally the Constitutional Court declared them unenforceable.

It is really a shame that Colombia is one of the few countries in which the military is judged by the ordinary [civilian] justice system, which knows nothing about issues, procedures and actions within an armed conflict.

But at the same time that Cepeda asks the military to pay [in civil court] for their blunders in the conflict, he asks forgiveness for the FARC for their forced disappearances, laying anti-personnel mines, recruiting boys and girls for war where they were raped and many girls later forced to abort, for attacks on the civilian population, for kidnapping and extorting. Instead, they [FARC terrorists] are sentenced to seats in Congress [under Colombia’s “peace agreement”].

Now let’s talk about Ivan Cepeda's ties with the José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers Collective, which had the Colombian state convicted for Manuel Cepeda’s death, and which defends the interests of Iván Cepeda in his prosecution processes.

Iván Cepeda has a great friendship with Alirio Uribe -- former president of the Lawyer’s Collective, and also an ex-M-19 combatant who on September 30, 1985, together with 30 other bandits, hijacked a truck [and] thanks to the reaction of the authorities, 28 were shot, but before dying they blew up the truck, killing several civilians, while two terrorists survived, including Alirio Uribe.

Now in our time Alirio Uribe poses as a dignified and intellectual man who together with Iván Cepda wrote a book defaming former president Alvaro Uribe, called Along the Paths of Uberrimo.

This group is recognized for welcoming and defending only victims of the state and the paramilitaries. But episodes such as the Mapiripán case sound in our memories, where that Collective condemned the Colombian state for said massacre at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

But later, it was possible to prove that of the 20 direct “victims” that this group represented, 12 weren’t in fact victims. Two were actually killed by the FARC prior to the massacre, three others were active members of the FARC, two others survived and one had died of natural death, while another -- a FARC guerrilla named Rusbel Asdrubal -- later demobilized.

In this episode, we Colombians had to pay a sum close to COP$3 billion [US$750,000] for each false victim.

Now Iván Cepeda has lined up batteries against the Centro Democratico party chaired by former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, whom Cepeda wastes no opportunity to persecute and defame.

Iván Cepeda, despite having said that his problem is with the head of the ‘extreme right’ (Uribe), says that he has no personal problem with Uribe, and the most paradoxical thing is that most of the complaints against Senator Uribe today have been promoted by Cepeda, whom Uribe himself has accused of meeting with paramilitaries in prisons to buy testimonies against him, and according to a statement made to the prosecution, at least two paramilitaries would accuse Iván Cepeda of trying to buy testimony against the former president.

Cepeda has repeatedly accused Uribe of having links with the paramilitaries and even of being the promoter of the Convivir, not mentioning the fact that this self-defense group -- created by Carlos Castaño Gil in the 1980s -- was created as a legal figure through Decree 356 of 1994 in the government of then-President Cesar Gaviria, not by President Uribe.

Cepeda fails to mention that the it was President Uribe who demobilized, imprisoned and extradited paramilitaries. Yet Cepeda accuses Uribe of being a paramilitary. And Iván Cepeda himself has met with [Uribe-extradited] paramilitaries in North American prisons, yet accuses Uribe of witness tampering.

Cepeda also hides the main reason for the extraditions, and that is that the Uribe government, through the Justice and Peace Law, conditioned the permanence of those paramilitaries [in local Colombian prisons rather than in U.S. prisons] on the promise of them to stop committing crimes.

But as they continued [to organize] criminal activities from prison, Uribe had them extradited [to U.S. prisons]. Hence many former paramilitary chiefs want to take revenge on Uribe and so far there are many paramilitaries who have been excluded from the Justice and Peace [amnesty] law, so they have declared against Uribe.

This is a juicy breeding ground for characters who hate Uribe to obtain false testimonies, complemented by all the propaganda and disinformation with which they have made against the head of Centro Democratico.

[During a Colombian Congress floor debate], Ivan Cepeda proposed a debate supposedly against paramilitarism. But from the beginning he showed that his objective was to stand against the honor and person of Senator Uribe.

As it is unconstitutional for one Senator to hold a debate against another, he camouflaged said debate by arguing that it was against paramilitarism. But during the debate [Cepeda] only focused on the public, private and family life of Senator Uribe, introducing demagoguery and lies that former President Uribe easily managed to dismiss.

In the debate promoted by Cepeda, allegedly against paramilitarism, we did not hear the name of Carlos Castaño, creator of the AUC Forces, nor the historical background or the reasons that led this character to create said organization, nor the impact that the FARC had on the creation of this monster by assassinating, kidnapping and extorting peasants and businessmen. The debate was only about Álvaro Uribe Velez from beginning to end.

Now, there is a question that always assails Colombians and it is this: why does Iván Cepeda hate Uribe so much?

We see that this hatred is such that Cepeda is able to meet paramilitaries in prisons and seek testimonies against Uribe, as certified by INPEC [Colombia’s prison authority].

We see how every day he seeks a way to attack the former President, for example with an unconstitutional debate in which he intends to act as a judge and ‘show’ Uribe’s links with paramilitarism -- links that he has not been able to demonstrate before the courts.

Why Cepeda distills so much hatred against now-former Senator Uribe [is ironic] because while Cepeda speaks of forgiveness and forgetfulness for the FARC, he refuses to forget the reasons for his personal hatred.

We Colombians do not understand the reasons for so much resentment, especially since during Uribe’s [presidency] the [left-wing] opposition was able to exercise politics freely. Indeed, it was one of the periods in which many leaders of the Left were able to return to the country from exile to engage in politics -- [thanks to President Uribe’s successful actions to prevent] deaths of leftist leaders, trade unionists and journalists.

Of course, there was also a comprehensive defense by the state against the armed Left of this country, who were attacked militarily, politically, economically, propagandistically and above all, against drug trafficking, a fundamental pillar of the economy and financing of the armed Marxist groups.

All these achievements in security [during President Uribe’s two terms] are obvious and the radical and armed Left of this country was deeply wounded to [near] death, so much so that there were massive demobilizations, which implied a disastrous loss -- even worse than the [military] casualties suffered by these Left armed groups.

A combatant who demobilizes did that because he [or she] managed to change thinking, disappointed in those [totalitarian Marxist] ideas. But a combatant who dies in the field of combat was someone who died faithful to ideals.

The great demobilizations of guerrillas [during the Uribe presidency era] shows the ideological crisis that the Uribe government caused within the armed Left. It is obvious that this affected and damaged the political Left as well.

Perhaps Senator Cepeda’s hatred against Uribe can be explained when on February 4, 2008, more than 11 million Colombians marched in repudiation of the FARC [the immense, global ‘No Mas FARC’ marches, by far the biggest in all Colombian history].

And just a month later, Iván Cepeda called a counter-march against the paramilitaries who were already in the process of demobilization at that time. Cepeda was seeking to overshadow the political defeat led by the Colombian people against Marxism.

But the curious thing about the matter is that the FARC on its ‘Anncol’ web-page promoted this march by Cepeda -- though it is said that in several [terrorized, FARC-sieged] municipalities, the FARC forced citizens to go out.

Perhaps this could shed much light about why Iván Cepeda strongly condemns any threat made by alleged paramilitaries, but overstates any act committed outside the law by a member of the public forces -- and is silent in the face of the murders that the FARC committed daily.

It would be good to ask Senator Cepeda if the victims of the FARC do not have human rights – or if they deserve the same human rights of whoever he is defending.

Written by September 03 2020 0

A new survey of voting-age residents here shows that Medellin Mayor Daniel Quintero damaged his favorable image in handling the Covid-19 crisis by excluding the Board of Directors of EPM -- the city’s biggest money-maker -- from a Hidroituango lawsuit decision that could turn catastrophic.

According to the Consultores de Opinion telephonic survey of 487 men and women of all socio-economic strata in Medellin, Mayor Quintero saw his formerly immense popularity -- 80% favorability -- in June 2020 fall to just 40.9% by late August 2020, while his unfavorability ranking soared from just 17% in June to 55.5% in late August (see chart, above).

According to Consultores de Opinion, the August 27-30 survey has a margin of error of plus-or-minus 2.63% with 95% confidence.

The same survey found that Quintero was overwhelmingly admired for helping to limit the growth of Covid-19 here, with 58% in favor of his novel “4x3” weekly business openings/closings rotation, designed to limit cross-infections.

Mayor Quintero’s over-all handling of the Covid-19 crisis likewise was rated “good” by 39% of voters and “regular” (acceptable) by 43%, with only 10.8% rating his crisis handling as “bad.”

Bottom line: Mayor Quintero apparently has squandered a vastly favorable public image over his handling of the Covid-19 crisis by unilaterally deciding to sue EPM contractors and insurers for Hidroituango project damages -- without first consulting the EPM Board on possible, less-risky alternatives -- and his earlier failure to consult the Board on radically altering EPM’s business model.

Quintero subsequently tried to explain the resulting mass resignation of the EPM Board by suggesting that those Board members had self-interested ties to companies that historically have done business with EPM – a claim that has only tangential or faulty evidence (see Medellin Herald August 17, 2020, “Alleged Conflicts-of-Interest in Hidroituango Damages-Recovery Scheme Prompts Clash Between Trade Groups, Mayor Quintero, Former Governor Perez, Former VP German Vargas”).

Even Medellin City Council members who likewise favored the Mayor’s idea of bringing a “conciliation” lawsuit against Hidroituango contractors and insurers have publicly condemned Quintero for arrogantly bypassing EPM’s board – a potentially colossal mistake that immediately cost EPM a bond-rating downgrade and widespread alarm among EPM debt holders on Wall Street.

Given the Mayor’s suggestion that the prior EPM Board had conflicts-of-interest that supposedly obviated objective Board consultations over the Hidroituango lawsuit decision, Wall Street analysts are now left puzzling over why the same Mayor accepted that same Board when he took office last January -- if Quintero really believed the Board was compromised.

Meanwhile, EPM’s own trade union of professional employees (Sinpro) has publicly suggested that Chinese government-owned hydroelectric dam builder China Three Gorges (CTG) might be maneuvering to take-over the Hidroituango construction-and-operations contract – sidelining the now-sued, existing contractors -- with new help from Mayor Quintero.

Coincidentally, the Chinese government’s official People’s Daily newspaper published a fawning report on Mayor Quintero in its August 19, 2020 edition, under the headline: “Daniel Quintero, Mayor of Medellín: ‘We Have Seen in China a Strong Investment Ally.’”

All of which -- according to Sinpro -- raises a troubling question: Is EPM’s existing Hidroituango insurance policy with Mapfre – which possibly could have paid for reasonably recoverable Hidroituango damages without going to court -- being compromised by a high-risk lawsuit, paired with a scheme to replace the old contractors – mainly unfriendly to Quintero -- with CTG, the new political “friend” to Quintero?

Written by August 17 2020 0

Former Colombia Vice President Germán Vargas Lleras, former Antioquia Governor Luis Perez and current Medellin Mayor Daniel Quintero are making noises over supposedly questionable conflicts-of-interest that triggered the mass resignation of EPM’s entire Board of Directors this month following EPM's sudden "conciliation" lawsuit against Hidroituango contractors and insurers.

In an August 15, 2020 interview in daily newspaper El Tiempo (Bogota), Mayor Quintero is quoted as saying that “some members [of EPM’s Board] -- Medellín knows it as a whole -- had or have very close relationships with the defendant consortia” in the conciliation lawsuit.

Similarly, former Colombia VP Vargas claimed in an August 16, 2020 opinion column in daily newspaper El Tiempo (Bogota) that the only way for EPM to recover massive losses caused by a 2018 diversion-tunnel collapse in the US$5 billion “Hidroituango” hydroelectric project is for EPM to do what it just did: sue the project contractors and their insurers, in conciliation (see Medellin Herald August 11, 2020, "EPM, Construction Contractors in Conciliation on US$2.6 Billion Losses from Hidroituango Tunnel Collapse in 2018").

Vargas suggests that this conciliation lawsuit is necessary because the now-departed members of EPM’s Board of Directors didn’t have EPM’s interest at heart, but rather were more interested in protecting Hidroituango contractors and insurers.

Rationale: Some of the newly-exited EPM board members had historic indirect ties to the influential Grupo Empresarial Antioqueño (GEA), a group of companies with interlocking stock holdings and which have had business relationships with EPM for many years.

What’s more, some former EPM general managers have or had worked for GEA companies and/or companies now involved in the conciliation lawsuit, Vargas noted, claiming that this somehow helps explain the mass resignation of the latest Board. Problem with this argument: the former EPM general managers weren’t on the current (just-resigned) EPM Board, undercutting the logic of the critique.

In any case, it’s not clear that even a supposed interest-conflicted Board would have voted to block EPM and Mayor Quintero from bringing the new conciliation lawsuit claims. Reason: They weren’t given a chance to debate the conciliation proposal, so it’s pure speculation to conclude what they would have done.

Former Antioquia Governor Luis Perez – who frequently clashed with former Medellin Mayor Federico Gutierrez over assigning blame for the Hidroituango diversion-tunnel collapse – likewise made similar insinuations in an August 12 interview with local TV station Cosmovision.

One problem with these Quintero, Vargas and Perez attacks: Except for now-former Board member Luis Fernando Álvarez Jaramillo -- who says on his resume that he is or was a legal advisor to Integral SA, one of the companies being sued in the conciliation proceeding -- the other seven of the eight EPM Board members who just resigned lack any current legal ties to any of the Hidroituango contractors, overseers or insurers – even if some of them had indirect or direct ties in the past. What’s more, only two of the now-former Board members historically had any ties to GEA companies.

Former Board member Andrés Bernal Correa – who in the past had risen to become a VP at Sura, one of the construction-contractor insurance companies being sued in the new conciliation action -- stated in an August 13 interview with local Medellin newspaper Vivir en El Poblado that the Quintero/Rendon decision to bypass the Board and sue contractors and insurers for conciliation contradicted already partly successful negotiations with project insurer Mapfre.

“We were already recovering the money [for Hidroituango damages], in fact the insurer [Mapfre] has already paid close to COP$550 billion (US$145 million),” Bernal said in that interview.

“What the [EPM] manager did [bringing the conciliation lawsuit] is one of the options [for damages recovery] and if we had studied it in the meeting, then we could have defined whether it was the most appropriate or not. We have always sought to recover that money. We were already recovering it. It is not that what the manager did was the only option. There are different paths and the right thing would have been analyzing pros and cons to make the best decision.”

Another of the just-resigned board members is Manuel Santiago Mejía, a founder of major retail group Corbeta and board member of civic-promotion group Proantioquia, which includes many GEA companies. However, Mejía doesn’t have any direct legal interest in the contractors or insurers being sued in the Hidroituango conciliation.

The other now-former EPM board members aren’t directly connected to any of the companies being sued.

Former Board member Aristizábal Guevara -- a retired EPM manager -- was a former board member of the Hidroituango corporate oversight entity, who (at worst) conceivably could be questioned for approving certain engineering decisions that possibly might have been linked to the tunnel-collapse incident. But there’s no published evidence showing he has any legal ties to GEA or the contractors.

Gabriel Ricardo Maya, first appointed to the Board in 2006 by former Medellin Mayor Sergio Fajardo, likewise doesn’t have any proven ties to the companies involved. Similarly, Javier Genaro Gutiérrez Pemberthy -- a former president of Colombia’s mostly state-owned Ecopetrol oil company -- doesn’t have known ties to the companies being sued.

The same lack of any legal ties to the companies being sued goes for now-former Board members Alberto Arroyave Lema and Elena Rico Villegas.

So what is all the noise about some supposed GEA plot and conflicts-of-interest?

ANDI Response

Just ugly noise, according to Bruce MacMaster, President of ANDI, Colombia’s biggest industrial and commercial trade association.

In an August 16 public bulletin issued by ANDI, MacMaster states the following (reproduced below in full):

“There are games that are dangerous and our politics is full of them. Populist attitudes that only seek to win votes by selling illusions [that] are impossible or unsustainable over time.

“The honor of people, as well as the reputation of institutions, is one of the greatest intangible assets that we have.

“During this week, given the serious situation that arose in EPM, the strategy of the municipal administration and some politicians has been to attack the reputation of past administrations and entities that have served Antioquia with honesty and example.

“The destruction of reputation is often effective in order to disqualify those who think differently, but it turns out to be the most unfair strategy intellectually and harmful for those who are being attacked.

“Of course, it is a violation of all the principles of corporate governance to make decisions behind the back of the Board of Directors and, even worse, to suggest that the reason why it was not informed is because it was likely that the decision would be ‘screwed up’ there.

“If that is the case, then how can it be understood that the Mayor [Quintero] was willing to continue with that Board and that he disagrees with its resignation?

“Of course, it is a bad practice of corporate governance [to bypass the Board on transcendental matters] -- and it is not the fault of the Mayor that [under current EPM corporate statutes] the Manager of EPM is handpicked by the Mayor as if he were a cabinet secretary.

“Of course, it is a bad practice of corporate governance for the Mayor to be the Chairman of the Board of EPM. This [current EPM corporate statute] is not the Mayor’s fault either, but it is obviously rejected by all entities such as the OECD. This is indeed an opportunity to put the house in order by changing these two provisions.

“EPM is a company and it is mandatory that everything around it works as such. It cannot be a hybrid between company and secretariat. If Medellín wants our public company to be successful in the market and annually provide more than COP$1 trillion [US$264 million] to the city so that Medellín can continue to be the envy of all, then it has to be well managed.

“There are many challenges EPM has at this time, perhaps more than ever, because EPM requires the most-expert of the experts to lead it.

“Why has the Antioquia business sector participated so actively in the processes of building public policy in the region? For one reason only: because the business sector is one of the few communities that has fully understood that public responsibility is everyone’s responsibility.

“Because the business community has also understood that politicians, in the best of cases, are good at defining public policy, in the legislative exercise, and in social leadership -- but that without a doubt politicians have immense shortcomings that can be strengthened by the administration of companies, in the creation of innovative processes and in the gestation and sustainability of entities that deserve the attention of the entire community, such as universities, museums, parks, or libraries.

“How much we have admired and even envied the commitment of the Antioquia community and society with their region! How many exemplary results have been achieved, which has been recognized by all in Colombia and beyond! Who are bothered by these results? Who wants to appropriate the ‘jewel in the crown?’ [that is, EPM].

“It is paradoxical to try to attack what has been a great virtue: that people who work for their society [are viewed by some] as pernicious. It is impossible not to think that this situation is being used by some politicians as the opportunity to get rid of the discomfort of being audited, accompanied, supervised, controlled and guided. Do politicians really think that they are the only ones with the possibility of giving an opinion and contributing to the construction of the public good?

“There will be those who say that these [oversight] functions are of the comptrollers, auditors and prosecutors. And they are partly right. But they forget that the latter [public enforcement regulators] have been designed to identify and punish mistakes, but not to get it right. Getting it right is not the job of not making mistakes, but rather of doing things well, and hopefully better and better. This is where the participation of the best minds and wills of any society make the best opportunities.

“Insinuations that the Antioquia business community takes advantage of positions in entities [such as the EPM Board of Directors] are unacceptable. If someone has complaints to make, then they have the obligation to make them. Not in opinion columns, or radio statements with generalities and statements that manage to cast a blanket of doubt about the reputation of institutions that have worked hard for the country. But [such charges should be brought] before the authorities, with evidence and making sure not to make reckless complaints.

“To affirm that the Grupo Empresarial Antioqueño and the business community have tried to appropriate EPM is not only false and manipulated, but it is also an accusation of immense gravity that merits the firm rejection of those of us who know the organization, its ethics and the principles that govern it. This strategy [of demagoguery] seems more like an attempt to get society to hand over everything of value to some political groups, rather than responsible reasoning.

“I reiterate our invitation to the Mayor to reflect on everything that can be lost at this time in Antioquia due to a situation that deserves to be redirected, taking into account the good of all, the future of society, the immense values built over the years, the possibility of community and joint work of proven suitability and with great possibilities of yielding virtuous results, putting aside any temptation of the ego, or the voices of counselors with intentions that raise many questions as well.

“This is not an issue only for Antioquia, it is a national issue. We must all defend EPM, but also defend the community of Antioquia businessmen who have done so much good for society and how necessary it is at this time in which Colombia requires activating all the instruments to generate employment, production and wealth for Colombian families.”

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About Medellin Herald

Medellin Herald is a locally produced, English-language news and advisory service uniquely focused upon a more-mature audience of visitors, investors, conference and trade-show attendees, property buyers, expats, retirees, volunteers and nature lovers.

U.S. native Roberto Peckham, who founded Medellin Herald in 2015, has been residing in metro Medellin since 2005 and has traveled regularly and extensively throughout Colombia since 1981.

Medellin Herald welcomes your editorial contributions, comments and story-idea suggestions. Send us a message using the "contact" section.

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